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THE RADIO PROPAGANDA AS AN INNOVATIVE ELEMENT
OF THE MILITARY TACTICS AND STRATEGIES OF THE NAZI GERMANY
1933-1941
The role of radio as one of the parts of the Nazi information space, formed in Europe before and
at the beginning of the Second World War, is revealed. Radio propaganda is presented as an
integral element of Nazi Germany's military tactics and strategy, which became important in the
psychological treatment of the population before the hostilities. Spreading radio broadcasting to
foreign countries by Nazi authorities, ambitions to gain popularity that would allow it to compete
with the media of England, France, the United States of America and the USSR, and radio broadcasts
from foreign countries, were considered. Almost all Nazi propaganda programs were targeted
primarily at the occupied territories. Significant role was played by the programs that promoted
Germany's great mission. Having secured a European radio space, Hitler's propaganda headquarters
began a true radio war in the East Europe. The purpose of the article is to expose radio propaganda
as one of the parts of the information space that Hitler's authority sought to form in the occupied
territories of Eastern Europe. The article analyzes the state of scientific development of the problem
in domestic and foreign historiography. The basic approaches to the research of the problem and
the methods of research of the content of radio transmissions, their influence on the population of
Germany in the 1930s of the XX century are determined. The scientific novelty of the presented
research is the demonstration of radio propaganda as an integral element of Nazi Germany's military
tactics and strategy. The outlined research period is 1933-1941, which explained by the fact that the
Nazi authority, spreading radio broadcasting to foreign countries, sought to gain popularity that
would allow it to compete with the media of England, France, the United States of America, Austria
and the USSR. Almost all Nazi propaganda programs focused primarily on the consolidation of
ethnic Germans abroad. Research confirmed that already during the German-Soviet War, techno-
logical advances in radio broadcasting were used not only by the Nazi authority, but also by the
authorities of England, the United States and the USSR. German radio propaganda was carried out
using specially developed techniques and methods. Among them are: official announcements in
which good news were reported in detail, unprofitable - superficial; the repetition of the enemy's
official announcements between information news which had a certain propaganda purpose - to
undermine the belief in the success of the enemy's action; sensational broadcasts that focused on
one important propaganda topic or event; the broadcasting of completely falsified material, that is,
fictitious, that the listeners could not immediately understand truth; official radio programs forged
with reference to fictitious sources were broadcast, as well as broadcasts based on a source of
information secretly controlled by Germany.
Keywords: radio; radio war; information space of Nazi Germany; media; propaganda.
Introduction
During the Second World War broadcasting seemed
to be one of the most important instruments for the pro-
paganda of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Broad-
casting as such powerful mechanisms of propaganda
influence as cinema, periodicals, theater was considered
to inform every citizen of necessary information. The study
of the role of broadcasting in that historical period is extre-
mely relevant because modern information technologies
were formed precisely in that period. Today some methods
of broadcasting information policy are known to be used
quite actively.
Having experience of the First World War and improving
its own methods of information policy and advocacy, the
Nazi leadership created a powerful information and pro-
paganda system which involved the press, radio, cinema
campaigning and other means of disseminating and dis-
torting information. Through these means, the occupying
power influenced the behavior and consciousness of the
population of Ukraine.
Forming the information space, the Hitler leadership
used methods and means of influence developed by Nazi
ideologists. Among them: control over the circulation of
information flows, the method of psychological impact -
traditional direct way of psychological impact on the mind
based on the conviction of people, appeal to their mind
using rational arguments, logic; the method of providing
the population with selective information is at the discretion
of the occupation administration; the method of big lies -
had become one of the most important in the policy of the
Nazi leadership in the occupied territory; partial truth me-
thod - creation of a false information structure based on
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real facts. With the help of the press, radio, cinema, leaf-
lets, posters, the German occupation authorities realized
the most daring propaganda ideas.
Through these funds, the population of the Reichskom-
missariat "Ukraine" and the military administration zones
misinformed, spread rumors and urged local residents to
support the occupation authorities, to contribute in every-
thing to its activities and to move further to the east of the
USSR.
Problems of methodology
The methodological basis of the Nazi radio propa-
ganda research as an integral element of Nazi Germany's
military tactics and strategy is a set of general scientific
and historical methods, including synthesis, historical-
typological, historical-comparative and statistical methods.
The synthesis method generates significant informa-
tion and reconstruction, based on the received data of the
specific situation in which Nazi radio propaganda operated
and developed mechanisms to counteract the Soviet infor-
mation space in the occupied territories of Ukraine and
the military administration area. The synthesis method
shows that the mechanisms and means by which radio
propaganda was carried out in different territories differed
and depended on the conditions of the occupation regime.
The historical-typological method helped to reveal the
same characteristics and features in different socio-poli-
tical structures and events of the socio-economic field (for
example, the means and mechanisms by which Nazi Ger-
many and the Soviet Union tried to impact on the occupied
territories by using radio propaganda as a tool). The his-
torical-comparative method made it possible to compare
the selected structural parts of the research subject
through time and to compare the forms and mechanisms
of radio propaganda among European countries and in
the occupied territory. The statistical method was the basis
for obtaining, processing, selecting and analysing infor-
mation from descriptive and statistical sources, which
plays a leading role in the structure of the source base of
this research. It gives the opportunity, at least in percentage
determination, to quantify the power of Nazi propaganda.
In general, the set of used methods helped to show
radio propaganda as one part of the information area that
Hitler's power sought to form in the occupied territories of
Eastern Europe.
The analysis of historiography
In war conditions radio, like periodicals, refers to the
means of influencing the human consciousness, to the
troops and population of the enemy. An analysis of the
properties of radio technologies conducted by well-known
Russian scientists V.L. Petrov, S.M. Sholokhov and A.V. Sne-
gurov (2001: 60-66) indicated that radio had been a
powerful informational weapon as multi-faceted nature of
its manifestations Despite the fact that in the 30-40s of the
twentieth century the radio and television were still under-
developed. The impact of these mass-media devices'
influence was quite significant.
Foreign historians, including A. Goody (2018), were
also involved in the study of radio and film propaganda for
the Third Reich, including the territory of the Soviet Union
in 1941-1944. H.-K. Jang (2020), D. Jenemann (2019),
S. Slutsch & C.Tischler (2018). Their writings show how
in the Third Reich the emergence of radio and film propa-
ganda took place and what were the mechanisms of
propagation of this propaganda in the territories of Europe
and other occupied territories. In particular, in the works of
A. Goody and H.-K. Jang describes the structure of the
Third Reich's propaganda and its effectiveness.
Radio and television were considered to be easier for
a person to perceive information in comparison with printed
propaganda materials. It is important that necessary infor-
mation should be transformed not only through comp-
rehension but also by ear and sight. That is why, as techno-
logical tools of information weapons, these propaganda
means quickly hit the human mind. They destroy the
methods and forms of own society identification.
With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939
radio propaganda techniques developed and improved.
Radio compares favorably with the fact that it easily
overcomes the borders of states and acts instantly. Radio
propaganda was becoming an integral part of Nazi Ger-
many's military tactics and strategy. The broadcasting
seemed to carry out a psychological preparation of the
population before the start of military operations. That
technology was adopted by the majority of European
countries being opponents of Germany. Thus having
entered the war Great Britain immediately had organized
broadcasting abroad in German. The United States of
America became to act so way.
Various types of propaganda stations and corres-
ponding types of radio propaganda were emerging. Among
them there was "white" radio propaganda. The stations of
this type had been officially registered, transmitting reliable.
But finely tuned information for solving specific problems;
"grey", as a rule, are official stations that used both verified,
reliable, and unverified, false information: rumors, con-
jectures, etc., "black" - underground stations that trans-
mitted frankly false information, misinformed the popula-
tion, carried out information sabotage. Frequently, "black
propaganda" was carried out with the help of transmitters
mounted on cars. It moved along the border of the state.
The so-called "black broadcast" was directed on the front
line. Often carriers of transmitters of "black" radio stations
were ships that cruised in neutral waters. The methods of
both "white" and "grey" and "black" propaganda were
actively used by the warring countries (Sharikov, 2008).
Undeniably that in modern world we must understand
that radio and television as an information weapon became
an important factor in the War of Hitler's Germany against
The United Kingdom, France, the United States and the
Soviet Union during the period 1941-1944.
In an effort to get the largest possible audience fascism
adopted a new, still underdeveloped communicative
technology like radio. Thanks to a new technology the
dissemination of information propaganda covered a wide
mass of the population. This method of communication
was more important and effective one than an oral speech.
Loudspeakers were installed in restaurants, factories, and
public places (Jowett, 1992: 187).
Germany had been the experience of "radio-war" on
sea since the period of the First World War. It quite
effectively impacted upon the fleet and troops of the
opponents. At the beginning of the Second World War "radio-
war" secured great advantages over the enemy. In the
interwar period in Germany there was not only radio as
developed military technology. The radio and television
undeniably worked as public communication institution
organizations. Radio broadcasting took place not only
within Germany but it was also conducted to European
countries (Goody, 2018: 204).
Since 1929, in Wusterhausen, not far from Berlin, the
German Wave had begun broadcasting its programs. The
task of which was to prepare programs for the Germans
living outside country. After the fascist coup of 1933 this
activity became extremely widespread. In the same period
a state structure was created. The German Broadcasting
Society included the "Department for Broadcasting to
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Foreign Countries". At the disposal of Hitler and the"
Ministry of Education and Propaganda" headed by Jo-
seph Goebbels it was one of the most advanced networks
of radio stations in the world. From Koenigsberg it was
possible to broadcast to Poland, from Hamburg and
Bremen to Great Britain, from Stuttgart, Frankfurt and
Saarbrücken to France and other European countries
(Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, 1996: 387).
In April 1933 one of the most powerful activities of the
German radio was the opening of transmission in North
America. There at that time there was quite the German
powerful diaspora which was about 10 million1. In the
period from 1933 to 1939, German broadcasting spread
to Africa, Latin America, the East and South Asia, Central
America, Brazil and the Arab world (Jang, 2020: 227). By
the beginning of the Second World War the Nazi's broad-
cast around the clock for 8 regions in seven languages.
Their average daily volume was 75 hours (Panfilov, 1984:
508). By spreading broadcasting to foreign countries,
fascist propaganda sought to achieve such popularity that
would allow it to compete with the media of those countries
and broadcasting of foreign countries. Almost all programs
of Nazi propaganda were focused primarily on the con-
solidation of ethnic Germans abroad. A significant role was
played by the programs that propagated the great mission
of Germany.
Consolidating its European broadcasting boundaries
the German propaganda headquarters began the "radio-
war" in Europe. One vivid example there was the agg-
ression against Austria. Motivating that there was a strong
ethnic unity between the German and Austrian peoples,
Austrian land was dealt with the part of German living space
and the Nazi elite in Germany launched an active radio
propaganda campaign against the Austrian government.
The "radio-war" was finished with the introduction of
German troops on its territory. A powerful propaganda
campaign was also waged against Czechoslovakia. The
main content and direction of those broadcasts was
propaganda directed against the Slavic peoples. Nazi
political propaganda did not go around Poland too. The
information war against this country began in January
1939. The Polish government was accused of threatening
Germany and harassing the German national minority. In
that situation the radio was a tool of kindling large military
conflict which actually became a pretext for the beginning
of the Second World War. On September 1, Nazi radio
spread a false version of the Polish invasion of German
territory stating the desire of the German government for a
peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict (Panfilov,
1984).
Such activities of the German fascist government see-
med to carry out provocations, and to shift the responsibility
for his aggression to other countries. The radio propa-
ganda played a very important role in this and became an
effective tool of Nazi policy.
No less powerful information broadcasting becomes
a weapon in the territory of Germany itself. It was one of the
main mechanisms of formation of information space "The
Third Reich".
Particular attention in the broadcasting of the 30s was
paid to the organization of the audience. The Nazis orga-
nized a pan-German campaign under the slogan "Every
citizen of the country is a radio listener." Active work was
conducted on collective listening to the radio in public pla-
ces and at enterprises. Decisive measures were taken to
protect the Germans from foreign broadcasting. To this
end, in 1933, they began to produce new types of receivers
for collective listening - the "national receiver" and the
"receiver of the German popular front".
These devices did not allow receiving foreign stations.
Firstly the receiver being intended for a public listening
appeared that year in Germany. It was called "Kamerad." It
could serve an audience of up to 500 people. Special short-
wave receivers were released only by two companies
known as "Telefunken" and "AEG". The models of short-
wave receivers were considered to intend "for Germans
who are abroad". It was written in advertising price list.
(Radioveshchanie v Tretem Reykhe, 2019).
Immediately after coming to power the Nazi elite like
put the radio at its service like all other media outlets. In
accordance with the decree of September 22, 1933, the
"Imperial Chamber of Culture" was established. It was
under the control of the "Ministry of Education and Pro-
paganda". It consisted of seven chambers: the press,
broadcasting, cinematography, theater, literature, music
and visual arts. Membership in one of these chambers
was compulsory for every German creative worker. Any
creative activity without appropriate membership
documents was punished by the Nazi authorities up to
and including imprisonment.
Radio and cinema, like the press, quickly became the
most important tools and means of influencing the
population. They took place at the service of the state.
Goebbels regarded radio. Later television became under
his control. Through the "Radio Department" of the "Ministry
of Public Education and Propaganda" and through the
"Broadcasting Chamber" he established full control over
the broadcasts, forming such a program content on the
radio that helped achieve Nazi goals by adapting their
content for the average listener. This task was also
facilitated by the fact that in Germany, as in other European
countries, broadcasting was a monopoly of the state. In
1933 the Nazi government became the owner of the "Reich
Broadcasting Corporation" (Shirer, 1991: 279-280).
Hitler got his hands on a well-developed mass media
and quickly turned it into an instrument of agitation and
propaganda. Of all the media that influenced the masses,
Hitler preferred radio. With the help of broadcasting the
Nazi government carried out restructuring of conscious-
ness a lot of Germans. In a fairly short time there was
turned most of the population into its supporters (Tyta-
renko, 2016: 631).
The peculiarity and extreme effectiveness of Nazi
propaganda, which was quite progressive at that time,
was that Goebbels earlier than others analyzed the pos-
sibilities of scientific and technological progress in the
field of media and communications, including the propa-
ganda capabilities of radio. In Germany, in the 1920s and
1930s, with a population of 650,000,000, 26,000,000
listened to the radio, because in spite of the crisis, the
country had one of the best radio networks in the world: 10
main transmitters and 15 auxiliary ones. Radio delivered
information, including propaganda of the NSDAP, to all
corners of the country and, thanks to its cheapness and
accessibility, was even more effective than the press.
It was only necessary to ensure the penetration of
disinformation of the population on the radio. This hap-
pened automatically, carried out against a national socialist
information background. The "National Socialist Party"
ideologically interpreted any events that had taken place
in Germany and in the world. Even after 1933, the Minister
of Propaganda of the "Third Reich" J. Goebbels recognized
the power of radio. He stated that "... the floods will be
forced to state that radio as a means of spiritual influence
1 International online magazine "Russkiy globus" (Russian Globe).
2004. No. 12, December: Retrieved from www.russian-globe.com/
N34/Lulechnik.NemstuVAmerike1.
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on the masses has and will have the same significance
as the invention of the press during the "Reformation".
One can, without fear of exaggeration, say that if there were
no radio and aircraft, the German revolution could not have
happened in the form in which it took place."2.
With the advent of the "National Socialist Party" and the
need to control German public life, the "Minister of Edu-
cation and Propaganda" J. Goebbels was entrusted with
full control over the work of German radio stations.
In March 1933 J. Goebbels gave national radio from
the custody of the "General Post Office" to the "Ministry of
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda". Since that time,
the work of German radio stations had been carefully
controlled personally by Goebbels. At the head of the
"Imperial Radio Chamber", which became part of the
"Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda of
Competence", he appointed Euzhena Hadamovskogo. He
took up the matter of radio transformation into an effective
instrument of Nazi propaganda not only in Germany and
Europe but also in the occupied territories.
Another government agency seemed to be directly
involved in broadcasting in the "Eastern Occupied Terri-
tories" was the "Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Terri-
tories". Within the framework of its activities, its Depart-
ments were mainly engaged in propaganda activities and
the creation of programs for the East. The programs were
broadcast over the radio station "Radio-East". Employees
of the departments formed short reports, comments,
disputes, etc.3
Listening to foreign radio in Germany without the
permission of the "German Information Office" was strictly
prohibited. The "Information Bureau" controlled that pro-
cess and issued permits for listening to foreign broadcasts
to individuals4. "The Ministry of the Eastern Occupied
Territories" punished for listening to foreign broadcasts
without a special permission. In order to avoid mistakes
and strengthen control by the "Propaganda Department",
a list was compiled of individuals and firms that have
already received such permissions5.
In Nazi Germany, under the leadership of Goebbels,
broadcasting was monitored and distributed by three units:
the leadership of the Nazi Party, the Ministry of Education
and Propaganda, and the Reich Culture Department.
26 radio stations represented the Institute of All-German
Radio Broadcasting under the name "Great German Ra-
dio". Political programs and speeches of the Führer went
synchronously across all stations (Entsiklopediya Tretego
Reykha, 1996: 388).
At the beginning of the Second World War, providing
radio broadcasting of great importance, the "Ministry of
Education and Propaganda" developed a project to create
a broadcasting center. Which power would reach 1000 km.
But due to a lack of funding and a sufficiently capacious
production process, these plans were not destined to
materialize. In spite of that fact at the beginning of the war,
6 long-wave and 10 medium-wave lightweight motorized
stations of 20 kW each were created (Zholkver-Krasno-
polskaya, 2007).
These stations were quite mobile. It was easy to
transfer its by rail in the occupied territories or to the front
areas. The positive thing was that they could be quickly
dismantled and be assembled in 2:00. These were such
mobile radio stations that had been used in the occupied
territory of Ukraine.
With the German attack on the USSR, German radio
radically changed the direction of its work. It was rebuilt in
a military fashion. From that moment on, the block of
political and military programs occupied the main place
on the air. Since 1940, the program "Voice of the Soldier"
began to be released. In the same period, a special infor-
mational and political program was created on military
events on the fronts, which was called "Emergency
Communications." Later, another program appeared,
known as "Message from the Front." Her messages were
broadcast live from airplanes that bombed the English
cities, from the advanced units of the German troops that
occupied the territories of other countries.
Unexpected difficulties arose in front of German radio
with the entry into the territory of the Soviet Union. In the
early days of the occupation of the territory of the Ukrainian
and Byelorussian SSR, the "Wehrmacht" troops realized
that at this stage radio propaganda was practically
impossible, since the Soviet government confiscated all
the radios from the population. The German newspaper
"Nakhtausgabe", dated March 11, 1942, in the article "Low
Level of Soviet Radio" noted that "... in the Soviet Union,
radio is very poorly developed. For 170 million people,
350,000 radio devices"6.
The leadership of Hitler's Germany had to create a
new network of powerful radio nodes and establish
broadcasting in the occupied territories. So the radio group
"Ukraine" was created. The main transmitter of which was
in Vinnitsa. As a result, by November 1941 in Ukraine 7
radio stations were broadcasting in Ukrainian. Subse-
quently, the number of radio stations increased to 15. Thus,
in almost every village there were radio transmitters. With
their help, the local population was informed about current
events and new directives that were developed and
published by the "Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Terri-
tories" and the Wehrmacht command (Okorokov, 2007: 44).
Dr. Taubert, Advisor to the Eastern Department of the
Ministry of Education and Propaganda, noted in his report
that it would be necessary to create a single radio network
in the occupied territories with a center in Berlin. For her
effective work, it was required, in his opinion, to combine
the work of the employees of the radio "Reichskom-
missariat" and the leaders of the group, who directly carried
out radio broadcasts. Whenever possible, he suggested
recruiting such employees from among the local popula-
tion, attracting them to cooperation on the basis of selec-
tion according to ideological views that are in the interests
of Nazi politics7.
From his report it is possible to conclude that most of
the programs that the "Eastern Department of the Ministry
of Public Education and Advocacy" broadcasts to the East
were designed to serve German soldiers and the popula-
tion of the occupied eastern territories. Broadcasts for the
population were conducted in Russian, Ukrainian, Belaru-
sian, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian. Most of the mes-
sages came directly from Berlin. This was due to the need
to quickly transmit various type of information: orders, direc-
tives, decrees and urgent messages to coordinate the
2 Kiyevskiy telegraf [Kiev Telegraph]. July 1-7, 2005. No. 26 (268).
Retrieved from http://209.85.129.132/-search?q=cache:e4EK1v-
WJBb0J:www.telegrafua.com/268/history
3 Imperskoe ministerstvo po delam okkupirovannykh vostochnykh
oblastey. DRVF. Fond 1363, List. 1, File 6, Page 14.
4 Gosudarstvennyy Russkiy voennyy arkhiv. Fond 1363. List 1.
File 67. Page 27-35.
5 Imperskoe ministerstvo prosveshcheniya i propagandy. Gosu-
darstvennyy Russkiy voennyy arkhiv. Fond 1363, List 1, File 78.
Page 17-23, 48-54.
6 Imperskoe ministerstvo prosveshcheniya i propagandy. Gosu-
darstvennyy Russkiy voennyy arkhiv. Fond 1358. List 1. File 1.
Page 17-23, 34.
7 Federalnyy arkhiv Germanii. Fond R 55/21044а. Page 109.
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management of the population of the occupied "Eastern
territories" and to carry out the necessary measures8.
Advocating its political goals and military aspirations
among the population of the occupied territories of the
USSR, the German occupation authorities paid much
attention to broadcasting as a means of disseminating
the necessary information and an instrument of mass
control. At the beginning of 1942, the German High
Command sent a special instruction to the Wehrmacht
troops on the use of the radio "Organizing the Hearing of
Radio Broadcasts in the Occupied Eastern Regions". It
noted that German troops participating in military operations
in the East, as well as those who were in the rear occupied
areas, should have understood how important it was to
cover the entire population with political propaganda
directly by broadcasting for further warfare. In particular, it
was noted that all technical equipment, which was in
military units at that time and was not used for official
purposes, should have been used to disseminate propa-
ganda and agitation of the population (Yudenkov, 1971: 71).
Under the "Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories",
subdivisions of departments were created, which were
responsible for information propaganda carried out in
various directions. Among them was the department of
group 18, which was responsible for the work of cinema
and radio in the occupied territories of the USSR. Among
the main tasks of the department was broadcasting all
programs, showing films on the basis of propaganda of
Nazi ideology and politics. The department also planned
a demonstration of weekly reviews, screening of short films,
propaganda, educational and documentary films (Slutsch,
Tischler, 2018: 576). News, reports were transmitted
through the radio network. A review of temporary events
was carried out, and other programs were broadcast using
musical means of agitation and propaganda. The powers
of this department included control and supervision of
cinema, radio, theaters, etc.9
A similar department was led by Dr. Goenstein. Having
a political orientation, this department carried out the
following functions: control over the political content of radio
and cinema information; organization of special content
programs; secret radio stations control; equipment care;
control and management of the central society of "Cinema
of the East".10
All materials that were broadcast on the radio and were
supposed to be transferred to the territory of the "Reichs-
kommissariat" and other territories occupied by the Ger-
man army underwent political processing in the "Propa-
ganda Department of the Ministry of Eastern Occupied
Territories"11. "Radio-Vostok" broadcasts, in particular for
the "Reichskommissariat of Ukraine", were prepared in
two languages: Russian and Ukrainian. 14 Russian and
14 Ukrainian programs aired daily. They consisted of news,
short reports, comments and broadcasts of musical
works12.
From the correspondence between the "Ministry of
Public Education and Advocacy" and the "Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Germany" we see how much attention the Hitler
leadership paid to radio propaganda, as one of the main
tools for creating the information space. Both ministries
were also involved in programming for the occupied
territories of the Soviet Union, together with the "Ministry of
the Eastern Occupied Territories." They developed prog-
rams aimed at discrediting the Soviet government and the
military leadership of the USSR, and gaining the favor of
the local population13.
Conclusions and prospects for further research on
this issue
The study confirms that already during the Great Patrio-
tic War the technological achievements of broadcasting
were used not only by the Nazi leadership, but also by the
leadership of Great Britain, the USA and the USSR. German
radio propaganda was carried out using specially
developed techniques and methods. Among them were
both official reports in which the news necessary from the
point of view of the Nazi ideology was presented in detail,
as well as news that had, at first glance, a superficial
character. These were repetitions of official adversary
messages between information that had a specific pro-
paganda purpose. They were supposed to undermine the
belief in the success of the cause of the enemy. There
were sensational broadcasts. They focused on one im-
portant propaganda topic or event. Students were offered
the transfer of completely falsified materials from fictitious
sources. All information broadcast was controlled from
Berlin.
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РАДІОПРОПАГАНДА ЯК НЕВІД'ЄМНИЙ ЕЛЕМЕНТ ВІЙСЬКОВОЇ ТАКТИКИ І СТРАТЕГІЇ
НАЦИСТСЬКОЇ НІМЕЧЧИНИ 1933-1941 РОКІВ
Розкрито роль радіо як однієї зі складових нацистського інформаційного простору, сформованого напере-
додні та на початку Другої світової війни. Радіопропаганду представлено як невід'ємний елемент військової
тактики і стратегії нацистської Німеччини, який став важливим у психологічній обробці населення перед
початком військових дій. Показано, як нацистське керівництво поширювало радіомовлення на зарубіжні
країни та на окуповані території, прагнуло досягти популярності, яка дозволяла б йому конкурувати із засо-
бами масової інформації Англії, Франції, США, Австрії та СРСР і радіопередачами іноземних держав. Майже
всі програми нацистської пропаганди були орієнтовані перш за все на населення окупованих територій.
Значну роль відігравали передачі, які пропагували велику місію Німеччини. Закріпивши за собою євро-
пейський радіопростір, пропагандистський штаб Гітлера розпочинає справжню радіовійну на сході Європи.
Мета статті - розкрити радіопропаганду як одну з частин інформаційного простору, яку прагнула сформувати
влада Гітлера на окупованих територіях Східної Європи. Проаналізовано стан наукової розробки проблеми у
вітчизняній та зарубіжній історіографії. Визначено основні підходи до дослідження проблеми та методи дос-
лідження змісту радіопередач, їх вплив на населення Німеччини у 30-х роках XX століття. Дослідження підтвер-
дили, що вже під час німецько-радянської війни технологічний прогрес у радіомовленні використовувався не
лише нацистською владою, а й владою Англії, США та СРСР. Німецька радіопропаганда велася за допомогою
спеціально розроблених прийомів та методів. Серед них: офіційні повідомлення, в яких детально висвітлюва-
лися хороші новини, та поверхово - погані; повторення офіційних повідомлень противника між інформаційни-
ми новинами, які мали певну пропагандистську мету - підірвати віру в успіх дій противника; сенсаційні транс-
ляції, що зосереджувались на одній важливій пропагандистській темі чи події; трансляція повністю
cфальшованого матеріалу, тобто вигаданого, що слухачі не могли відразу зрозуміти істину. Транслювалися
офіційні радіопрограми, підроблені з посиланням на вигадані джерела, а також передачі на основі джерела
інформації, таємно контрольованого Німеччиною. Наукова новизна цього дослідження - демонстрація радіо-
пропаганди як невід'ємного елемента військової тактики та стратегії нацистської Німеччини.
Ключові слова: радіо; радіовійна; інформаційний простір нацистської Німеччини; ЗМІ; пропаганда.
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